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Abstract
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) as Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 2015, issued new regulations
regarding the administration of the Remuneration Governance for Banks. With this rule, the
remuneration policy applied by the Bank to Employees, Directors and Commissioners should be
adjusted to follow the rules and principles set out in POJK No.45 /POJK.03/2015. Issuance of this
Regulation as part of the implementation of Basel II, particularly Pillar 3 (Market Discipline), which
the Bank is required to disclose information that is more transparent to the public and market
participants, particularly related to remuneration to encourage discipline and allow the stakeholders to
give a fair assessment. Failure to follow these rules can result in a downgrade of the factors of good
corporate governance of the Bank concerned. Implementation of POJK 45 starts per 1 January 2016 for
Commercial Bank Operations Group (BUKU) 3 and 4 as well as foreign banks. This study aimed to
analyze the implementation of POJK 45/2015 on the financial performance of banking in Indonesia. The
data which are used in this study were obtained from the Indonesian Banking Directory quarterly and
look at the first kuartal of 2016 only. Samples were selected by purposive sampling method and finally
obtained 27 banking companies that fulfill the criteria. Data were analyzed using financial ratios that
LDR, ROA and CAR then described using qualitative description method. The results showed that the
implementation of POJK 45 gives the significant positive effects on the bank performance in Indonesia.
Keywords : Bank Performance, Financial Performance, POJK 45, Remuneration
INTRODUCTION
Banking sector performance relative to
increase in line with the global trend led to
the management expects a form of appreciation
for the achievement of the performance they
have done. One form of the award given by
the company to motivate management in the
form of compensation. Compensation is defined
as a sum of money or awards granted by an
organization or a company to its employees,
as payment for its services in performing duties,
obligations and responsibilities (Muljani, 2002).
In the banking sector, with the provision
of a high and competitive compensation to
employees (particularly executives) are expected
to create productivity, profit, and the growing
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business. Based on the financial numbers that
have been published, these expectations have
been realized. Indonesia's banking industry
profitability levels continued to increase (up
30% - 50% per year) and consistent asset growth
on average over 20% (Infobank, in October
2011, 33). As a consequence of the improvement
of the financial performance, the owners of
the bank gave awards to executives in the form
of compensation increases or higher. The
increase in compensation was awarded in the
form of cash-based compensation such as salary
and benefits and equity-based compensation.
Increasing the salaries of bankers national
banks considered something normal. This is
due to the national banking industry continues
to grow while the supply of professional bankers
are not comparable with the request. In the three
years since 2007, the remuneration received by
directors and commissioners of the bank increased
by 65% (2007-2010), an average of more than
21% per year. During 2010 the numbers increase
in the remuneration of directors and commissioners
of the bank stood at 19%, much higher than the
previous year, which is only 5% (Infobank,
October 2011).
Infobank (October 2012) mentions that
bankers in Indonesia received the highest
compensation compared with the bankers in
other countries in the ASEAN region. Compensation
bankers in Indonesia which consist of salary,
bonus, routine allowance, gratification and other
facilities Rp. 12 billion per year. While in Malaysia
is only Rp. 5.6 billion per year, even in the
Philippines is only Rp. 1.1 billion per year or
one-twelfth of Indonesia. Earlier, remuneration
in banks in Indonesia has been arranged by
Bank Indonesia to the remuneration and nomination
committee. But executive remuneration to the
bank based on the Limited Liability Company
Act (PT) in 2007. Salaries are set in the GMS
(General Meeting of Shareholders), which became
the highest forum of shareholders. The system is
commonly used in awarding compensation
is not the salary system of reward system.
Employees who could generate big profits
will get the rewards are great as well from
the company. In other words, the compensation
awarded based on the achievement of performance
that has been made by the management with its
professional expertise.
However, this condition is not always linear
to the actual state of the banking industry in
Indonesia. Infobank (in October 2011, 11)
suggested that based on the activities carried
out explicitly, there is no relationship between
income with remuneration. Offering high
remuneration not based on profit revenue
reflecting the performance of the banking
system. There is a bank which provides a
remuneration of more than 30% of the profits,
but there is also that only 3% of profit. In
addition, there is no link between a number
of assets to the amount of remuneration for
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remuneration decisions are governed by the
general meeting of the forum.
Indonesia as a member of the G20 committed
to adopting the principles of the Principles
for Sound Compensation Practices issued by
the Financial Stability Board in 2009. The principle
is rising in response to the global economic
crisis in 2007 that allegedly partly due to the
practice of bonuses unhealthy, high bonuses
but by ignoring the risks that will arise in
the future so that harm the financial condition of
the bank if the bank is unable to absorb such
losses. The principle is part of the agenda of
the global financial system reform program
that aims to prevent the emergence of moral
hazard and promote prudential element in
the management of the Bank; maintaining the
health of the bank on an individual basis; and
mitigating the existence of excessive risk taking
that is performed by the decision makers. In
2015, the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan as Financial
Services Authority issued new regulations
governing the administration of the Remuneration
Governance for Banks. With the publication
of these regulations, the remuneration policy
applied by the Bank to Employees, Directors
and Commissioners should be adjusted to follow
the rules and principles set out in POJK No.
45/POJK.03/2015.
LITERATURE
Executive compensation policy is basically a
form of agency contracts between shareholders
(principal) with the management company
(the agent). Prihatiningtyas (2012), reveals that
the interests of owners and management
companies can be harmonized by basing
compensation to one or more measure of
achievement in the company's performance.
Thus the determination of executive compensation
policy is one way that can be done in order
to drive improved performance.Management is
responsible for optimizing the benefit of owners
or shareholders, and in return the management
will be compensated in accordance with the
contract. Own company expects management
can improve the performance of a policy of
granting the right compensation. Employers
give high compensation with the goal of keeping
employees motivated to improve productivity
or achieve performance high levels. Compensation
will make management feel responsible for
improving performance. Thus the management
will try to make the company's performance
continues to increase. According to Indra (2011)
compensation is one factor either directly or
indirectly affect the level of employee performance.
The number of studies that focus on
management compensation has increased in
parallel with the increase in the number of
executive salaries over the last two decades.
The study was conducted in developed countries,
especially the United States (US) and Britain
(Murphy, 1999). This is due to the growing
popularity of executive compensation issues
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and the ease of getting data through a stock
exchange of large private companies in the
country (Ramaswamy et al., 2000). According to
Kato, Kim, and Lee, (2006), in developing
countries, especially in Asia, research on
executive compensation is rarely done due
to lack of adequate data.
Research on executive compensation to
performance was conducted by previous
researchers as Kato, Kim and Lee (2006); Brick,
Palmon, and Wald (2005); Mangistae and Xu
(2004), which concluded that executive compensation
is not related to company performance. Inversely
proportional to this, the theoretical study
contained in the print media Infobank concluded
that the compensation provided by the owner of
the company has been comparable to the
performance conducted by executives. In
addition, the compensation is also one way
in which the owner of the company to solve
the agency conflict that often occurs internally
within the company caused by the asymmetry
of information. Jensen and Murphy (1999)
states that the provision of the compensation
package can be used to overcome the problem of
moral hazard management. The higher the
compensation to be awarded, the company
expects increased performance management.
Issuance of POJK 45/2015 also as part of
the implementation of Basel II, particularly
Pillar 3 (Market Discipline), which the bank
is required to disclose information that is
more transparent to the public and market
participants, particularly related to remuneration
to encourage discipline and allow the stakeholders
can provide a reasonable assessment. Failure
to follow these rules can result in a downgrade
of the factors of good corporate governance
of the Bank concerned. And the implementation
of POJK 45/2015 starts in 2016 for the Commercial
Bank Group Business Activities (BUKU) 3
and 4 as well as the foreign banks.
In general, the content of POJK 45/2015
calling attention to the importance of the
precautionary principle in remuneration. Therefore,
accordingly to the description of the precautionary
principle. This study wanted to see the
implementation of article 5 of POJK 45/2015,
where the remuneration policy should consider
the creation of an effective risk management;
financial stability of the bank; strengthening
capital adequacy of the Bank; short and long-
term liquidity requirements; and potential
earnings in the future.
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATAS
This study used cross section data is
secondary data in the first quarter of 2016.
Where POJK 45/2015 effective as of January
1, 2016, for banks that stand within the bank
at BUKU 4, BUKU 3 and foreign banks which in
total amounted to 27 banks. The banks will
be samples of the study, which banks of BUKU 4
consists of 4 banks, BUKU 3 consists of 15
banks and foreign bank consists of 8 banks.
The Implementation of Pojk 45/2015 (Anna Sardiana & Alvien Nur Amalia)& 5
Financial ratios are used to determine
the financial performance of the sample bank.
Financial ratios used is the implementation
of article 5 of POJK 45/2015, in which the
remuneration policy should consider the creation
of an effective risk management; financial
stability of the Bank; strengthening capital
adequacy of the Bank; short and long-term
liquidity requirements; and earnings potential in
the future. Thus this study uses the ratio of
loan to deposit ratio (LDR) which is a proxy
of liquidity, Return to Asset Ratio (ROA) which
is a proxy of the profitability, and the Capital
Adequacy Ratio (CAR) which is a proxy of
the capital adequacy of banks. The data was
obtained from the financial ratios Banking
Quarterly Reports issued by OJK in March
2016.
FINDINGS
Table 1. Bank Financial Performance Assessment
KINDS OF BANK LDR ROA CAR
GROUP of BUKU 4 BANKS
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero), Tbk 88.81 3.65 19.49
Bank Mandiri (Persero), Tbk 86.72 2.58 18.48
Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero),Tbk 87.97 3.03 19.87
Bank Central Asia,Tbk 78.92 3.57 20.04
Average 85.61 3.21 19.47
GROUP of BUKU 3 BANKS
Bank OCBC NISP 94.7 2.05 18
Bank Danamon 90.16 1.66 22.06
Bank Mizuho 222.69 2.34 22.17
Bank BTPN 96.01 2.67 25.51
Bank DBS Indonesia 101.26 1.28 19.88
Bank Mega 64.88 2.07 23.3
Bank Sumitomo Mitsui 245.54 1.72 24.29
Bank Panin 107.58 -0.58 17.9
Bank Permata 89.71 -1.14 15.1
Bank CIMB Niaga 94.49 0.62 17.88
Bank UOB 89.69 0.89 17.34
Bank Bukopin 81.79 1.37 15.95
Bank BTN 108.98 1.56 16.5
Bank BJB 74.1 2.55 19.01
Bank Maybank Indonesia 87.55 1.35 15.86
Average 109.941 1.361 19.381
GROUP of FOREIGN BANKS
Bank of China Limited 129.65 3.43 26.68
Citibank, NA 72.08 4.46 28.86
Deutsche Bank AG 55.39 5.4 47.76
JP Morgan Chase, NA 95.99 4.48 36.67
Standard Chartered Bank 88.91 1.61 17.02
The Bangkok Bank Comp, Ltd 304 5.78 58.68
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd 249.46 3.05 81.27
The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V. 0 1.16 115.2
Average 124.44 3.67 51.52
Source : OJK, 2016 (Data processed by author)
DISCUSSION
Liquidity Levels
At BUKU 4 Banks group, liquidity saw
from several banks LDR sample can be seen
in Table 1 above that the Banks at BUKU 4
group, BNI has the highest LDR value among
the three other banks. The higher LDR showed
indication of the low capacity of the relevant
bank liquidity (Dendawijaya, 2003). But these
banks value ratio is still below 110 percent,
where the average value of its LDR is 85.605
percent. According to the terms of the assessment
procedure for the health of banks which set
by Indonesia Central Bank (BI) got a credit score
of 100. This value can be interpreted that the
liquidity of banks at BUKU 4 group in the healthy
category.
While the banks at BUKU 3 group, the value
of LDR can be seen that the group of BUKU
3 Banks, the highest LDR value occupied by
Sumitomo Mitsui Bank at 245.54 percent, among
the fourteen other banks. The higher the LDR
showed indication of the low capacity of the
relevant bank liquidity (Dendawijaya, 2003).
The average value of LDR BUKU 3 Banks is
below 110 percent, amounting to 109.941 percent,
which in the assessment of bank health ordinances
stipulated by BI and get 100 credit score. This
value can be interpreted that the liquidity of
banks at BUKU 3 group categorized as healthy,
even though if viewed from each of the banks,
there are two banks which have possession
of the LDR value over 110 percent, which
amounted to 222.69 percent for Mizuho Bank
and 245.54 percent for SumitomoMitsui Bank.
In the Group of Foreign Bank, at table 1
above can be seen that The Bangkok Bank Comp.,
Ltd has the highest LDR value among the seven
other banks, that equal to 304 percent. The higher
of LDR showed an indication that the relevant
bank has low capacity of liquidity (Dendawijaya,
2003). The average LDR value of a Foreign Bank
is above 110 percent, amounting to 124. 435
percent, which in the assessment of healthy
bank ordinances stipulated by and get 0 credit
score. This value can be interpreted that the
liquidity of foreign banks categorized as unhealthy,
although when viewed from each bank, of
those 8 foreign banks into the sample, there are
5 banks which have LDR below 110 percent,
and indicates that liquidity into the five banks
in the category of healthy.
When LDR viewed from the average of
three groups of banks mentioned above, the
BUKU 4 and 3 Banks have a value below 110
percent, even though there are 2 banks of BUKU
3 has LDR above 110 percent. This means that
the two groups of banks were able to pay for
any withdrawals made by depositors. While
foreign banks which have an average above
110 percent is considered unable to pay
withdrawals made depositors, even if viewed
individually 5 of 8 foreign banks having LDR
below 110 percent, and individually these
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five banks were able to pay withdrawals to
depositors.
Level of Profitability
Levels of profitability seen the value of Return
On Asset (ROA), demonstrated the ability of
banks to make a profit overall, so the greater
value of ROA, the better the position of a bank in
using its assets for a profit. At table 1 above,
can be seen that the BUKU 4 Banks group, BRI
has the highest ROA that is 3.65 percent, which it
means BRI having the ability of most good at
using its assets for a profit compared to the three
other banks. When viewed from the ROA
average value of BUKU 4 banks group, the banks
are able to obtain an increase of the return in
3.21 percent, if able to increase total assets by 1
unit (eg. billion).
Whereas in the group of BUKU 3 banks,
the ROA value shows that BTPN has the
highest ROA that 2.67 percent, which means
having the ability of most good at using its
assets for a profit compared to the fourteen
other banks. When viewed from the average
ROA value of BUKU 3 banks, then if the banks
are able to increase total assets by 1 unit (eg
billion), the banks are able to obtain an increase
of 1.36 percent profit. In table 1 above, can be
seen that there are two banks which have a
negative value, that Panin Bank has a ROA -
0.58 and -1.14 ROA of Permata Bank, indicating
that there is no proper management on the use
of its assets, for every increase of 1 unit (eg.
billion) will bear the loss of 0.58 percent for
Panin Bank and 1.14 for Permata Bank.
The ROA of foreign banks group, The
Bangkok Bank Comp. Ltd has the highest ROA
of 5.78 percent which means it has the most
ability in the use of its assets for a profit
compared to seven other banks. When viewed
from the average ROA value of foreign banks
group, then the banks are able to get a 3.8 percent
increase in profit if able to increase total assets by
1 unit (eg billion). And when viewed from the
average value of ROA, the foreign bank group
had an average value of the highest ROA that 3.8
percent. In this case, most foreign banks in the
management of its assets, for every increase
of 1 unit of assets (eg billion), foreign banks will
gain 3.8 percent.
Capital Adequacy Levels
BI has stipulated Capital Adequacy Ratio
(CAR) at least 8 percent for Indonesian Banking.
Based on Table 1 above, the highest CAR owned
by Bank Central Asia at 20.04 percent, which
means that every increase of a unit of risk assets,
the bank's capital used to finance risk assets
rise 20.04 percent. The CAR average of BUKU 4
Banks are 19.47 percent is well above the
minimum CAR of 8 percent which set by BI,
thus categorized as healthy and being able to
finance risk assets amounted to 19.47 every
increase of 1 percent of these units. Whereas
in the group of BUKU 3 banks, the highest CAR
owned by Bank BTPN amounted to 25.51
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percent, which means that every increase of
1 unit of risk assets, the bank's capital used to
finance risk assets rise 25.51 percent. The CAR
average of BUKU 3 banks are 19.38 percent
is well above the minimum CAR of 8 percent
which has fulfilled BI requirements, thus
categorized as healthy banks because the bank is
able to finance the risk assets of 19.38 percent
at every increase of 1 unit of the risk assets.
The CAR of foreign banks as shown in the
table above is owned by The Royal Bank Of
Scotland N.V as the highest CAR which amounted
to 115.2 percent, which means that every increase
of 1 unit of risk assets, the bank's capital used to
finance risk assets rise 115.2 percent. The CAR
average of foreign banks amounted to 51.52
percent well above the minimum CAR of 8
percent as set by BI, thus categorized as healthy
banks, then being able to finance risk assets
amounted to 51.52 percent for every increase
of 1 unit of the risk assets. In general of 3 kinds of
the banking group, the highest CAR average
is owned by foreign banks. This can occur
because of few risk assets owned. Foreign
banks in Indonesia is a branch office of the
headquarters in their own countries, and therefore
they choose to avoid any risks.
CONCLUSION
At the enactment of POJK 45/2015 per
January 1, 2016, can be concluded that banking
financial performance assessment such as, at
the level of liquidity, BUKU 4 and 3 banks have
a better performance than foreign banks group.
But when it viewed from profitability levels,
the group of foreign banks is able to produce a
higher profit than BUKU 4 and 3 banks.
Meanwhile, if viewed from the level of capital
adequacy, the highest CAR average value
owned by foreign banks than Buku 4 and 3
banks. This can occur because a few of owned
risk assets that the foreign banks in Indonesia is
a branch office of the headquarters in their
own countries, and therefore they choose to
avoid any risks. The bank's financial performance
assessment is very important because it is
related to the sustainability business of the
bank, and POJK 45/2015 aimed the business
continuity of the bank in Indonesia. In this study,
a grace period of 3 months is still an adaptation
process for the banks to impose such regulations,
so the impact of POJK 45/2015 on the bank's
financial performance has not been able to look
perfect. Then subsequent research is expected to
add a period of research using other analytical
methods.
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